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A household is Ricardian if inter-generational altruistic linkages are operative within the
household and if it fully understands the government’s budget constraint. Ricardian house-
holds offset any changes in the timing of taxes with inter-generational transfers (Ricardo,
1820, reprinted in 1951; Barro, 1974). So, for example, an increase in budget deﬁcits or
pay-as-you-go social security spending would be offset with larger transfers from parents to
their children; a move toward a funded social security system would be offset with smaller
transfers, possibly negative (i.e., gifts from children to their parents). As a result, these
otherwise important ﬁscal policies are effectively irrelevant if the Ricardian assumption is
an accurate description for many households. It is not surprising, therefore, that Ricardian
equivalence has generated a lively debate during the past several decades. See, for exam-
ple, the literature reviews in Bernheim (1987), Weil (1989), Seater (1993), Barro (1996),
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Smetters (1999).
While many economists do not believe that Ricardian equivalence is a close description
of reality,1 the actual empirical evidence itself is mixed. Extensive empirical work by Evans
(1985, 1987a,1 9 8 7 b), papers written before modern extensive panel data sets became widely
available, shows that different aggregate variables seem fairly invariant over time to changes
in the levels of government debt, consistent with Ricardian equivalence. However, Feldstein
(1982, 1996) and Evans (1998) show that aggregate U.S. consumption might be substantially
impacted by the levels of unfunded U.S. Social Security net wealth, inconsistent with Ricar-
dian equivalence. Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), Lesnoy and Leimer (1985), and CBO (1998),
though, argue that social security time series estimates are quite sensitive to how the social
1For example, in Slemrod’s (1995) survey of the National Tax Association (including 521 academics, 406
government employees, and 381 private sector employees), 89 percent of those responding (45 percent of the
academics, 32 percent of the goverment employees, and 28 percent in the private sector) responded in the af-
ﬁrmative to the question, “Does a large federal budget deﬁcit have an adverse effect on the economy?” Of
the academics that responded, 84 percent responded in the afﬁrmative. While this question does not probe the
perceived severity of the negative effect, it still indicates that many economists regard budget deﬁcits as quite
material.
2security wealth variable is constructed. Seater (1993) reviews many other empirical tests,
both supportive and not supportive of Ricardian equivalence. He notes that while some of
these indirect tests using aggregated data might lack power (as veriﬁed by Cardia, 1997), the
sheer number of tests failing to reject Ricardian equivalence provides some support of the
Ricardian proposition as an approximation, assuming that the power of the different tests are
fairly orthogonal.
Household-level data sets have become more widely available in the past decade or so,
therebyallowingfora moredirecttestofthealtruismtenetunderlyingRicardianequivalence.
Tomes (1981) and Bernheim (1991) ﬁnd some evidence in favor of the altruism model. The
papers by Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992, 1996, 1997) use the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. They ﬁnd some evidence of inter-generational transfers consistent with the al-
truism model, but only a little. For example, AHK (1997) shows that redistributing $1 from
a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a $0.13 increase in the inter-generational
transfer from parent to child, much less than the $1 transfer implied by the altruism model.2
Wilhelm (1996), using federal estate tax return data, also ﬁnds little evidence that bequests
compensate for earnings differences between parents and children. Most recently, Cox,
Hansen, and Jimenez (1999) and Cox (2001) ﬁnd evidence for risk sharing in developing
economies, although short of the strong predictions of the altruism model. Page (forthcom-
ing) ﬁnds evidence that inter-generational transfers made by many households are sensitive
to differences in tax rates across U.S. states, consistent with the Ricardian model. In sum,
the household-level evidence seems to suggest some risk-sharing, but not as strongly as that
predicted by the standard altruistic model.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the low level of risk sharing observed between parent
households and children households is not necessarily inconsistent with Ricardian equiva-
lence. We build a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in
the presence of two types of shocks: an “observable” shock that is public information among
households (e.g., public redistribution) and an “unobservable” shock that is private informa-
tion (e.g., idiosyncratic wages). Parents and children observe each other’s total income but
2Other authors have regressed consumption growth on income growth in order to test for the presence of risk
sharing outside of the family. See Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994). Altu˘ g and Labadie
(1994) discuss the empirical methodology in detail.
3not each other’s endogenous level of labor market effort. Hence, a risk sharing arrange-
ment contingent on effort level (the ﬁrst-best solution) is not possible. In the second-best
optimum, unobservable shocks are only partially shared due to moral hazard. But, at the
same time, observable shocks (e.g., tax timing changes) will be fully shared, due to inter-
dependent utility, provided that the utility function satisﬁes a condition derived herein. As
a result, our model can reproduce the low degree of risk sharing found in recent studies, but
Ricardian equivalence still holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper sets up the basic principal-
agent model between parents and their children. Section 3 demonstrates how familial
risk sharing arrangements distort work incentives (i.e., create moral hazard) when ﬁrst-best
arrangements are not possible. Section 4 formally derives the ﬁrst-best and second-best
optimal risk sharing arrangements. Section 5 presents some examples of utility functions
in which Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of a potentially low level of observed
risk sharing. Section 6 discusses the inter-dependence of the risk sharing arrangements for
observable and unobservable shocks in the second-best equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Income Shocks and Risk-Sharing Arrangements
Consider two altruistic households, i ∈ {1,2}, e.g., parents and children. Each household
places the same weight on each other’s utility equal to φ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, and receives two types
of income shocks, si and ti.T h es h o c ksi is an idiosyncratic income shock to household i
that is unobservable to the other household, −i. The shock ti is a government tax transfer
to household i that is observable to both households. The “pre-tax” labor income yi of
household i (i.e., before observable shocks) is deﬁned as the sum of its unobservable effort
level (“hours worked”), hi, and unobservable shock si, i.e.,
yi = hi + si.
The sum yi is observable, but its components are not independently observable, prohibiting
ﬁrst-best risk sharing.3 For simplicity, households 1 and 2 receive symmetric shocks —
3Hence, our model has some similarities with the optimal income tax literature started by Mirrlees, which
also assumes that the government cannot observe hours worked. While parents with children living under the
4i.e., household i receives si and ti, and household −i receives s−i = −si and t−i = −ti.
Hence, these shocks are always insurable within two households. The cumulative probability
distributions for si and ti, F (si) and G(ti), are independent and symmetric around zero.4
So, E (si)=E (ti)=0 .
Both types of shocks can be shared among households. Let σ ∈ [0,0.5] be the risk-
sharing plan for unobservable shocks si. In particular, σ is equal to the proportion of the
unobservable shock, si [s−i], that is shared by the other household −i [i]. The income of
household i after risk sharing, therefore, is deﬁned as
(1 − σ)yi + σy−i =( 1− σ)hi + σ h−i +( 1− 2σ)si, (1)
w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a ts−i = −si. The risk-sharing plan σ =0indicates no risk
sharing while σ =0 .5 indicates perfect risk sharing (equal division of income).
Similarly, let τ ∈ [0,0.5] denote the risk-sharing plan for the observable shock ti.I n
particular, τ is equal to the proportion of the observable shock, ti [t−i], that is shared by the
other household −i [i]. The amount of the observable shock borne by household i after risk
sharing, therefore, is
(1 − τ)ti + τ t−i =( 1− 2τ)ti, (2)
where we used the fact that t−i = −ti. Similarly, the risk-sharing plan τ =0indicates
no risk sharing, and τ =0 .5 indicates full risk sharing. The notation for the model is
summarized in Table 1.
2.2 The Timing of the Model
The timing of the households’ actions are as follows:
1. Two households determine the risk-sharing plan (σ,τ) b a s e do nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o n so f
the shocks, F (si) and G(ti), and the degree of altruism φ that is part of their utility
function shown below;
same roof might be in a slightly better position than the government to monitor hours worked by their children,
most parents are still not able to monitor many key variables captured by our h term including job performance,
hours spent looking for work, etc. For households not living under the same roof (comprising most of the sample
in the empirical studies referenced in Section 1), observing hours worked is also difﬁcult.
4The assumptions of independence and symmetry are just normalizations since two correlated shocks can be
decomposed into two uncorrelated shocks (by deﬁnining the idiosyncratic shock as the difference), each with
mean zero, along with some other deterministic terms.
5Table 1: Model Notation
i ∈ {1,2} Household
yi ∈ R Labor income (earnings)
hi ∈ [0,1) Effort (working hours)
ci ∈ R+ Consumption of goods
li ∈ (0,1] Leisure
φ ∈ [0,1] Degree of altruism
si ∈ R Unobservable shock to household i’s resources (si = −s−i)
ti ∈ R Observable shock to household i’s resources (ti = −t−i)
σ ∈ [0,0.5] Proportion of unobservable shock, si [s−i],s h a r e db yh o u s e h o l d−i [i]
τ ∈ [0,0.5] Proportion of observable shock, ti [t−i],s h a r e db yh o u s e h o l d−i [i]
F(si) ∈ [0,1] Cumulative probability distribution for the unobserved shock si
G(ti) ∈ [0,1] Cumulative probability distribution for the observed shock ti
2. Each household decides its working hours (effort level), hi and h−i;
3. Two types of shocks, (si,s −i) and (ti,t −i),a r er e a l i z e d ,w h e r esi = −s−i and ti =
−t−i;
4. Income is redistributed between households based on the risk-sharing arrangement,
(σ,τ).
2.3 The Household Problem and Optimal Effort, h
Altruism between parents and children is two-sided. The two households place an equal
weight, φ, on each other’s utility, where φ =1indicates full altruism and φ =0indicates no
altruism. The household i’s problem is
max
ci,li
E [u(ci,l i)+φu(c−i,l −i)] (3)
subject to
ci =( 1 − σ)yi + σy−i +( 1− τ)ti + τ t−i
=( 1 − σ)hi + σh−i +( 1− 2σ)si +( 1− 2τ)ti,
c−i =( 1 − σ)y−i + σyi +( 1− τ)t−i + τ ti
=( 1 − σ)h−i + σhi − (1 − 2σ)si − (1 − 2τ)ti,
li =1 − hi,
6l−i =1 − h−i.
Substituting ci, c−i, li,a n dl−i into the utility function, the problem becomes
max
hi
E[u((1 − σ)hi + σh−i +( 1− 2σ)si +( 1− 2τ)ti,1 − hi) (4)
+φu((1 − σ)h−i + σhi − (1 − 2σ)si − (1 − 2τ)ti,1 − h−i)].
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to hi is,
(1 − σ)Eu c (ci,l i) − Eu l (ci,l i)+φσEu c (c−i,l −i)=0 .
By the symmetric assumption, the expected utilities of two households are the same, i.e.,
Eu c (ci,l i)=Eu c (c−i,l −i).
So, we have
(1 − σ + φσ)Eu c (ci,l i) − Eu l (ci,l i)=0 . (5)
Moreover, the optimal working hours of two households are the same, i.e.,
hi = h−i = h,
and the optimal working hours, h(σ,τ;φ,F(si),G(ti)),s o l v e
(1 − σ + φσ)Eu c (h +( 1− 2σ)si +( 1− 2τ)ti,1 − h) (6)
−Eu l (h +( 1− 2σ)si +( 1− 2τ)ti,1 − h)=0 .
3 The Impact of Risk Sharing on Effort
Although it is difﬁcult to solve for h analytically since we have not yet speciﬁed a utility
function, this section characterizes how the optimal working hours vary with the risk-sharing
plan, (σ,τ). Towardthisend, wemakesomestandardassumptions about the utilityfunction.
Utility is assumed to be increasing in the level of the consumption of goods and leisure but
at a decreasing rate (uc > 0, ul > 0, ucc < 0, ull < 0); the marginal utility of consumption
and leisure might be separable or non-separable provided that it is non-decreasing in the
7level of the other (ucl = ulc ≥ 0) but at a non-increasing rate (uccl = uclc = ulcc ≤ 0;
ullc = ulcl = ucll ≤ 0); and agents do not exhibit imprudence (uccc ≥ 0).5
Lemma 1 (Impact of σ on effort, h)
(1) When two households are not fully altruistic to each other (0 ≤ φ < 1), the optimal level
of effort, h, is strictly decreasing in the amount of the unobservable shock that is shared by
the other household, σ,f o ra l lσ ∈ [0,0.5].
(I.e., φ < 1= ⇒ d
dσh(σ,τ) < 0 for σ ∈ [0,0.5].)
(2) When two households are fully altruistic to each other (φ =1 ) , theoptimallevel of effort,
h, is unaffected by a small change in σ if σ equals 0.5 or if uccc = ulcc =0 ;o t h e r w i s e ,h is
strictly decreasing in σ.
(I.e., φ =1= ⇒ d
dσh(σ,τ)=0for σ =0 .5 or uccc = ulcc =0 ;a n d d
dσh(σ,τ) < 0 for
σ ∈ [0,0.5) and (uccc > 0 or ulcc < 0).)
Proof. Totally differentiating the ﬁrst-order condition (6) with respect to h and σ,w e
have
−{(1 − φ)Eu c +2( 1− σ + φσ)E [uccsi] − 2E [ulcsi]}dσ





(1 − φ)Eu c +2{(1 − σ + φσ)E [uccsi] − E [ulcsi]}
(1 − σ + φσ)(Eu cc − Eu cl)+( Eu ll − Eu lc)
. (7)
Since ucc < 0, ull < 0,a n ducl = ulc ≥ 0, the denominator on the right hand side becomes
strictly negative. We now want to prove that the numerator is positive. Since the two types

















=( 1 − 2σ)
Z
ucccdG(ti) ≥ 0,
5By deﬁnition, a “prudent” agent precautiously supplies extra effort, h, in order to buffer future uncertainty,
which, in turn, only happens if uccc > 0. If agents are risk averse (ucc < 0) but not prudent (uccc =0 )t h e n
consumption and leisure choices will equal their “certainty equivalent” values, as demonstrated by the Quadratic
Utility example presented in Section 5.
8holding with equality if and only if σ =0 .5 or uccc =0 .S o ,
R
uccdG(ti) is strictly negative









holding with equality if and only if σ =0 .5or ulcc =0 .S o ,
R
ulcdG(ti) is non-negative and
non-increasing in si.W h e n F(si) is symmetric with mean 0, we, therefore, have E[uccsi] ≥
0andE[ulcsi] ≤ 0. Accordingly, (1−σ+φσ)E[uccsi]−E[ulcsi] ≥ 0, holdingwithequality
i fa n do n l yi fσ =0 .5 or uccc = ulcc =0 .W h e n φ < 1,s i n c e(1 − φ)Eu c > 0,w eh a v e
dh/dσ < 0 for all σ ∈ [0,0.5].W h e n φ =1 ,w eh a v edh/dσ ≤ 0, holding with equality if
a n do n l yi fσ =0 .5 or uccc = ulcc =0 .
Discussion. Let’s ﬁrst discuss the case in which altruism is not full, followed by the case
in which altruism is full.
(1) In words, d
dσh(σ,τ) < 0, implies that households exhibit less effort as the level of
risk sharingbetween households increases. When altruismisnot full(φ < 1), households at-
tempt to take advantage of a greater amount of risk sharing by working less. Each household
values an increase in its own leisure but bears only a fraction of the concomitant decrease
in its own wage income under positive levels of risk sharing. As a result, moral hazard is
a problem whether households exhibit prudence (uccc > 0)o rn o t( uccc =0 ). But when
agents are also prudent, the increase in risk sharing, σ, also reduces their prudence-driven
supply of effort, h. The reason is that effort level decisions are made before the shocks are
realized. Hence, a prudent household will supply less effort in lower risk situations associ-
ated with more risk sharing. So the effects of moral hazard and prudence work in the same
direction in order to generate less effort as risk sharing increases, thereby allowing us to sign
the derivative dh
dσ under fairly general conditions.
(2) In words, d
dσh(σ,τ)=0means that effort is unaffected by the level of risk sharing.
Only when altruism is full (φ =1 )w i l lh o u s e h o l di [−i] place the same value on its own
leisure and consumption as that of household −i [i]. As a result, only with full altruism will
both households not have the incentive to freeride off the risk-sharing provided by the other
household since there is no moral hazard. So if, in addition, households are not prudent
(uccc =0 ), then their level of effort is unaffected by the level of risk sharing. If, however,
9household exhibit prudence (uccc > 0), then their effort level, h, decreases as risk sharing
improves even without moral hazard, provided that σ < 0.5.
When altruism is full and σ =0 .5, effort is unaffected by a small change in σ.T h e
reason is that the functional h(σ,·) is parabolic in σ over the domain [0,1] with a minimum
at σ =0 .5. To understand this fact intuitively, suppose that we hypothetically raised σ
above 0.5, that is, outside of its proper domain [0,0.5].6 Whereas full risk sharing occurs at
σ =0 .5, equation (1) shows that risk-sharing would actually be reduced at values of σ above
0.5. (In the extreme case where σ =1 .0, for example, both households would simply swap
the full amount of their risks with each other without actually sharing any of it.) In other
words, any deviation from 0.5 reduces risk sharing. Since households are prudent, their
chosen level of effort, h, therefore, must increase if σ is set above 0.5, in the same way that
effort must increase if σ is set below 0.5. Hence, σ =0 .5 is the minimum of the parabola
h(σ,·) and so d
dσh(σ,τ)=0at σ =0 .5.
Lemma 2 (Impact of τ on effort, h) R e g a r d l e s so ft h el e v e lo fa l t r u i s m( i . e . ,0 ≤ φ ≤ 1),
the optimal level of effort, h, is unaffected by a small change in τ if τ equals 0.5 or if
uccc = ulcc =0 ; otherwise effort, h, is strictly decreasing in τ.
(I.e., d
dτh(σ,τ)=0for τ =0 .5 or uccc = ulcc =0 ; d
dτh(σ,τ) < 0 for τ ∈ [0,0.5) and
(uccc > 0 or ulcc < 0).)
Proof. Totally differentiating (6) with respect to τ and h,w eh a v e
−2{(1 − σ + φσ)E [uccti] − E [ulcti]}dτ





2{(1 − σ + φσ)E [uccti] − E [ulcti]}
(1 − σ + φσ)(Eu cc − Eu cl)+( Eu ll − Eu lc)
. (8)
Since ucc < 0, ull < 0,a n ducl = ulc ≥ 0, the denominator of the right hand side is strictly
negative. Similarly to the previous proof, we can show that E [uccti] ≥ 0 and E [ulcti] ≤ 0.
Hence, (1 − σ + φσ)E[uccti] − E[ulcti] ≥ 0, holding with equality if and only if τ =0 .5
6In fact, we could allow σ and τ to be deﬁned over [0.0,1.0]. But it is easy to show that points above 0.5
would never be chosen in equilibrium. In particular, if φ < 1 then moral hazard becomes larger for points above
0.5; the same amount of risk sharing can be obtained with less moral hazard by chosing points below 0.5. If
φ =1 .0, then, as shown below, full risk sharing (0.5) is optimal; a point above 0.5 would lower risk sharing.
10or uccc = ulcc =0 .S o , dh/dτ ≤ 0, holding with equality if and only if τ =0 .5 or
uccc = ulcc =0 .
Discussion. Comparing the last two lemmas, notice that the relationship between the
level of effort, h, and the amount of the observable risk that is shared, τ, is similar to the
response of effort to the amount of the non-observable shock that is shared, σ,u n d e rf u l l
altruism (φ =1 ). Intuitively, there is no private information contained in observable shocks;
and when shocks are unobservable, there is no desire to take advantage of the private in-
formation when altruism is full. Hence, in both cases, the direct role of moral hazard is
not present. However, notice, from equation (8), that dh/dτ is not independent of σ unless
uccc = ulcc =0(i.e., unless agents are not prudent). In other words, the change in the effort
level in response to a change in τ cannot be determined independently from σ since σ also
affects the optimal choice for h. The inter-dependence of σ and τ is discussed in Section 6.
4 The Optimal Risk-Sharing Arrangement (σ,τ)
This section derives the ﬁrst-best and second-best optimal risk-sharing arrangements (σ,τ).
As proven below, if ﬁrst-best risk-sharing arrangements were available (i.e., all shocks were
observable) then shocks would be fully insurable. Similarly, full insurance is optimal in the
second-best equilibrium provided that agents are fully altruistic (φ =1 ) . I nb o t ho ft h e s e
cases, moral hazard does not exist since either: (i) agents have no private information (as in
the ﬁrst-best equilibrium) or (ii) agents have no incentive to take advantage of their private
information (as with full altruism).
In the more general case, whenprivate information existsand altruismisnot full(φ < 1),
moral hazard becomes relevant. The optimal risk sharing arrangement, therefore, must
balance the beneﬁts of risk sharing against the costs of moral hazard. Moral hazard prevents
full risk sharing. Still, we demonstrate that observable shocks will be fully shared provided
that preferences satisfy a condition that we derive. In other words, Ricardian equivalence
c a nh o l di nt h ep r e s e n c eo fi n c o m p l e t er i s ks h a r i n g .
Lemma 3 The optimal risk-sharing arrangement (σ,τ) solves the following set of equa-
11tions:
(1 − φ)σhσEu c − 2E [ucsi]=0 (9)
and
(1 − φ)σhτEu c − 2E [ucti]=0 . (10)
Proof. By the symmetric shock assumption,
E [u(ci,l i)+φu(c−i,l −i)] = (1 + φ)Eu(ci,l i).
The optimal insurance combination (σ,τ) is obtained by solving
max
σ,τ Eu(ci,l i)=Eu(h(σ,τ)+( 1− 2σ)si +(1− 2τ)ti,1 − h(σ,τ)).
The ﬁrst order conditions are
hσEu c − 2E [ucsi] − hσEu l =0
and
hτEu c − 2E [ucti] − hτEu l =0 .
Using the ﬁrst order condition for h, equation (5), to eliminate Eu l, gives equations (9) and
(10).
4.1 First-Best Risk-Sharing
The previous lemma nests the solutions to the ﬁrst-best and second-best equilibrium. To get
the ﬁrst-best equilibrium, we can simply normalize si =0in order to remove the unobserv-
able shock, leaving only the observable shock.7
Proposition 4 With only observable shocks (si =0 ) , risk is fully shared (i.e., τ =0 .5).
7Alternatively, we could have two observable shocks by specifying F(si) =0f o ra l lsi < ˆ s and F(si) =1f o r
all si > ˆ s for some ˆ s (the atom of the distribution). In this case, it is easy to show that both observable shocks
will be fully shared, i.e., (σ,τ)=( 0 .5,0.5). The single shock in the text can be interpreted as the simple sum
of two shocks.
12Proof. If there are no unobservable shocks (si =0 ), no risk sharing based on the labor
















holding with equality if and only if τ =0 .5.W h e n G(ti) is symmetric with mean 0,w e
have E [ucti]=0if and only if τ =0 .5.
Discussion. In the ﬁrst-best economy, there is no moral hazard. Full risk sharing,
therefore, is always desirable in the presence of concave preferences. Risk sharing reduces
(in fact, with symmetric shocks, eliminates) the variability in income of each agent without
reducing the expected income. This result is analogous to the standard result in insurance
economics that full insurance is optimal if there are no premium loads.
4.2 Second-Best Risk-Sharing
We now derive the second-best risk-sharing arrangements in the presence of unobservable
shocks, i.e., when F(si)is not degenerate. We ﬁrstconsiderthecaseoffullaltruism(φ =1 )
followed by the more general case of non-full altruism (φ < 1).
4.2.1 Full Altruism (φ =1 )
Proposition 5 When two households are fully altruistic to each other, perfect insurance is
optimal for both unobservable and observable shocks, i.e., φ =1= ⇒ (σ∗,τ∗)=( 0 .5,0.5).





















which holds with equality if and only if σ =0 .5.W h e n F(si) is symmetric with mean 0,
we have E [ucsi] ≤ 0 with equality if and only if σ =0 .5. Hence, σ∗ =0 .5 is required
for E [ucsi]=0to hold. Similarly, E [ucti] ≤ 0, which holds with equality if and only if
τ∗ =0 .5.
4.2.2 Altruism Less than Full (φ < 1)
Proposition 6 When two households are not fully altruistic to each other, the second-best
level of risk sharing for the unobservable shock is less than full, i.e., φ < 1= ⇒ σ∗ ∈
(0,0.5).
Proof. By Lemma 1, hσ =d h/dσ < 0 for all σ ∈ [0,0.5]. By assumption, φ < 1.B y
the previous proof, E [ucsi] ≤ 0 with equality if and only if σ =0 .5.S o , w h e n σ =0 ,t h e
left-hand side of equation (9) becomes
(1 − φ)σhσEu c − 2E [ucsi]=−2E [ucsi] > 0,
which contradicts equality with zero. When σ =0 .5,
(1 − φ)σhσEu c − 2E [ucsi]=( 1− φ)σhσEu c < 0,
again contradicting equality with zero. Since the left-hand side of equation (9) is continuous
for all σ ∈ [0,0.5], the optimal σ that satisﬁes equation (9) exists and σ∗ ∈ (0,0.5).M o r e -
over, since the left-hand side of equation (9) is positive at σ =0and it is negative at σ =0 .5,
then the second-order requirement for a maximum is also satisﬁed.
Proposition 7 As u f ﬁcient condition8 for observable shocks to be fully shared (τ∗ =0 .5) —
i.e., for Ricardian equivalence to hold — is
E [ucti]{ΦE [uccsi] − E [ulcsi]} ≤ E [ucsi]{ΦE [uccti] − E [ulcti]}, (11)
where Φ =1− σ + φσ.
8Of course, the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for Ricardian equivalence are that equations (9) and (10)
hold with τ
∗ =0 .5 and σ
∗ ≤ 0.5.
14Proof. SimilartotheproofforLemma1, itcanbeshownthatτ =0 .5impliesE [uccti]=
E [ulcti]=E [ucti]=0 . From equation (8), hτ =0 .T h u st h eﬁrst order condition (10)
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Since E [ucti] < 0 and E [ucsi] < 0, the inequality (11), therefore, is a sufﬁcient condition
for τ∗ =0 .5.
Proposition 8 In the special case in which utility is separable (ucl = ulc =0 ), a sufﬁ-
cient condition for observable shocks to be fully shared (τ∗ =0 .5) — i.e., for Ricardian
equivalence to hold — is
E [ucti]E [uccsi] ≤ E [ucsi]E [uccti]. (12)
Proof. By assumption, E [ulcsi]=E [ulcti]=0 . From Proposition 7, the inequality
(12) is a sufﬁcient condition for τ∗ =0 .5.
Corollary 9 (Existence of (σ∗,τ∗)) If condition (11) or (12) holds, then a second-best risk
sharing arrangement, (σ∗,τ∗), exists in which Ricardian equivalence holds despite the pres-
ence of imperfect risk sharing (0 < σ∗ < 0.5; τ∗ =0 .5).
Discussion. Two observations are in order. First, notice that degree of altruism does
not play an important role in the ﬁrst-best equilibrium but it does play an important role in
the second-best equilibrium. As emphasized by Barro (1974, 1996), the degree of altruism
itself is not critical for Ricardian equivalence to hold in the standard deterministic altruistic-
linkage model or, similarly, in the ﬁrst-best equilibrium in the case of uncertainty. As long as
altruism is strong enough for inter-generational transfers (in either direction) to be operative,
15all shocks will be fully shared between parents and their children in the ﬁrst-best equilibrium.
Inthesecond-bestequilibrium, however, thedegreeofaltruismplaysacriticalroleinlimiting
the degree to which unobservable shocks are shared. Only if altruism is full (φ =1 )will all
shocks be fully shared in the second-best equilibrium since only then do parents and children
not have the incentive to take advantage of their private information. When altruism is less
than full (φ < 1), only observable shocks will be fully shared in equilibrium.
Second, the inequality (11) or (12) is not strong enough to rule out the possibility of
multiple second-best equilibria. Stronger conditions on the utility function are required
in order to ensure uniqueness. We do not derive the conditions required for uniqueness
in this paper since that issue is both quite complicated and unnecessary for our purposes.
(The next section, however, does provide several examples of preferences for which the
equilibrium is unique.) Even if multiple equilibria exist for a particular utility function,
the above analysis proves that risk sharing will be incomplete at each equilibrium; however,
Ricardian equivalence still holds for any utility function satisfying (11) or (12).
5 Examples: Quadratic, CARA, and CRRA
The previous section demonstrated that the second-best level of risk sharing for the unob-
servable shock is generally less than full (except when φ =1 ) but that the observable shock
might be fully shared, i.e., Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of incomplete house-
hold risk sharing. This section explores some examples of preferences in which Ricardian
equivalence holds, including quadratic, Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, and Constant Rel-
ative Risk Aversion. Analytical results can be provided for the cases of quadratic and CARA
utility but, not surprisingly, we must rely on numerical calculations for the CRRAcase where
closed-form solutions are impossible.
Example 10 (Proposition) When the utility function, u(c,l), is separable in consumption
and leisure, and its consumption part takes the quadratic form, full insurance for an observ-
able shock is optimal, i.e., τ∗ =0 .5.














=( 1 − 2τ)
Z
ucccdF(si)=0 .
When F(si) and G(ti) are symmetric with mean 0, E[uccsi]=E[uccti]=0 . Thus, the
sufﬁcient condition (12) holds with equality.
Example 11 (Proposition) When the utility function, u(c,l), is separable in consumption
and leisure, and its consumption part is one of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), full
insurance for an observable shock is optimal, i.e., τ∗ =0 .5.
Proof. When the utility function is CARA with the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion
η,w eh a v eucc = −η uc for all si and ti.T h e n ,
E [ucti]E [uccsi]=E [ucti]E [−ηucsi]=E [−ηucti]E [ucsi]=E [uccti]E [ucsi].
The sufﬁcient condition (12) holds with equality.
Example 12 (Conjecture) When the utility function is separable and its consumption part
is one of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
γ ≥ 0, full insurance for an observable shock is optimal, i.e., τ∗ =0 .5.
Discussion. The CRRA example above is labeled a “conjecture” because closed-form
solutions are not possible with CRRA utility. Instead, we constructed a computer program
(written in Maple and run with 30 digits precision) that used a grid search algorithm to solve
for the global optimum, (τ∗,σ∗) ∈ [0,0.5] × [0,0.5], for a given set of utility parameters.
This grid search algorithm was then run over a large range of utility parameters. In each
case, τ∗ =0 .50.
Table 2 presents some illustrative numerical results for the CRRA speciﬁcation: c1−γ
1−γ +
β · l1−γ
1−γ ,w h e r eβ is set to unity. Obviously, this example is not intended to be a carefully
calibrated numerical experiment. Rather, our intention to demonstrate the role of the risk
aversion parameter, γ, in helping determine the optimal risk sharing arrangement, (τ∗,σ∗).
Notice that τ∗ =0 .50 in each case, i.e., the observable shock is always fully shared. Notice
also that the σ∗ is increasing in γ.O n e r e a s o n t h a t σ∗ increases is that moralhazard becomes
less important at higher levels of γ; in particular, agents that are very prudent have less
incentive to try to freeride off the risk sharing provided by the other agent. To see why,







recall that agent’s i’s pre-tax income equals, yi = hi + si. Less freeriding (i.e., higher hi)
reduces agent i’s probability of suffering from low value of yi after the unobservable shock
si is realized. As a result, more risk can be optimally shared among higher prudent agents,
since they are less likely to try to take advantage of it. Another reason that σ∗ increases in
γ is that the utility value of risk sharing increases in γ. As a result, the balance between
controlling moral hazard and providing risk sharing shifts toward more risk sharing as the
value of γ increases.
6 The Joint Determination of τ∗ and σ∗ in the Second-Best Econ-
omy
Thus far, we have proven that (i) all shocks will be fully shared in the ﬁrst-best economy
while (ii) the non-observable shock will only be partially shared in the second-best economy.
Both of these results were proven to hold provided that the derivatives, cross-derivatives and
higher-order derivatives of the utility function satisﬁes some fairly general conditions that
were stated in the beginning of Section 2. We then showed that (iii) the observable shock
may be fully shared in the second-best equilibrium. However, in proving result (iii), we
speciﬁed an additional sufﬁcient condition, (11). The presence of this additional condition
l e a d st oa ni n t e r e s t i n gq u e s t i o n :w h yw a s n ’ ta ne x t r as u f ﬁc i e n tc o n d i t i o nu s e dt od e m o n s t r a t e
full risk sharing in the ﬁrst-best economy, result (i)? In other words, if a shock is fully
observable, does it really matter if non-observable shocks are also present, as in the second-
best economy? In still other words, why doesn’t result (iii) immediately follow from results
(i) and (ii), thereby allowing us to avoid the additional sufﬁcient condition (11) that we
used to prove result (iii)? This section answers these questions by demonstrating the inter-
18Table 3: Utility Levels at the Equilibrium and Various Non-Equilibrium Risk Sharing Ar-
rangments
τσhu
0.50∗ 0.04∗ 0.486∗ 2.822∗
0.50 0.50 0.200 2.683
0.00 0.50 0.227 2.687
dependence of τ∗ and σ∗ in the second-best economy whenever agents are prudent.
As noted in Section 2, equation (8) shows that dh/dτ is not independent of σ unless
uccc = ulcc =0(i.e., unless agents are not prudent). As a result, we generally cannot set
τ∗ and σ∗ independently of each other in the second-best economy (unless agents are not
prudent). In contrast, all shocks can, of course, be independently shared in the ﬁrst-best
economy where complete contracting is available.
We now illustrate the joint determination of τ∗ and σ∗ in the second-best economy using
the CRRA example considered in the previous section with γ =0 .5. Table 3 reports the
agent’s level of effort, h, and utility, u, at the second-best equilibrium tuple (τ∗,σ∗)=
(0.50,0.04) as well as at two non-equilibrium values of (τ,σ). Of course, the highest level
of utility is at the second-best equilibrium point that is marked in Table 3 with asterisks
(*). But now consider the other two non-equilibrium tuples where the level of risk sharing
for the unobservable shock is set above its optimal level (i.e., σ > σ∗). Notice that the
tuple (τ,σ)=( 0 .50,0.50), where both shocks are fully shared, generates less effort and
lower utility than the tuple (τ,σ)=( 0 .0,0.50) where the observable shock is not shared at
all. In other words, the “third-best” (i.e., constrained) outcome does not necessarily fully
share the observable shock when the unobservable shock is being shared too much relative
to its second-best level. The reason is due to prudence. When σ > σ∗, too much of
the unobservable risk is being shared and so the level of effort exerted by each household
is below its optimal level. Setting τ < 0.50, therefore, forces households to accept more
risk associated with the observable shock and, hence, exert more effort, thereby reducing the
moral hazard problem associated with sharing the unobservable shock.
In sum, the values of τ∗ and σ∗ cannot be determined independently in the second-
best economy in the presence of prudent agents. The sufﬁcient condition (11) guarantees,
19though, that observable shocks will be fully shared in equilibrium. This sufﬁcient condition
is not needed in the ﬁrst-best equilibrium where it is always efﬁcient to share a given risk,
independent of how other risks are shared.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence can hold even in the presence of incom-
plete risk sharing between parents and their children. Moral hazard prevents unobservable
idiosyncratic shocks from being fully shared. Still, observable shocks, including changes in
the timing of taxes, might be fully shared in equilibrium, i.e., Ricardian equivalence holds.
Ricardian equivalence is proven to hold under a sufﬁcient condition derived herein. We
considered several speciﬁcations for preferences in which Ricardian equivalence holds, in-
cluding separable quadratic, separable CARA, and separable CRRA. (In the CRRA case,
closed-form solutions are not available and so we can only conjecture that Ricardian equiva-
lence holds based on numerical simulations). Future work could possibly extend our results
to anevenlarger classofutilityfunctions, althoughwefounditdifﬁcult toobtainclosed-form
solutions for cases beyond separable quadratic and separable CARA. Future empirical work
using linked household-level data could also attempt to distinguish between non-observable
and observable shocks, such as social security reforms. Performing such estimation, how-
ever, would be quite challenging at present; modern data sets do not yet span a long enough
period containing many policy shocks such as changes in social security beneﬁtl e v e l s . I n
other work in its preliminary stage, we are exploring how a principal-agent model with moral
hazard might also be useful in explaining the “equal bequest puzzle” that has been receiving
more attention recently (e.g., McGarry, 1999; Bernheim and Severinov, Forthcoming).
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